dpToplines
Ukrainian forces continue to interdict several bridges that support ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on June 11 that Ukrainian forces struck several bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea: a bridge over the North Crimean Canal near occupied Preobrazhenka and Myrne; the Perekop-Armyansk Road Bridge; and the Stavky Road Bridge overnight.[1] The Stavky, Myrne, and Armyansk bridges run over the North Crimean Canal and along the M-17 Armyansk-Oleshky highway.[2] Saldo added that Ukrainian strikes against the bridges caused unspecified damage. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kherson direction reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics route to occupied Crimea through Armyansk, damaging or destroying roughly 50 Russian military cargo vehicles carrying fuel and ammunition.[3] The commander stated that Russian forces diverted logistics to the Armyansk route after Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 7 to 8 and on June 9 damaged the Chonhar bridge.[4] Saldo temporarily closed traffic via the Chonhar bridge on June 9 due to damage following the strike.[5] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces were able to strike this concentration of vehicles at least in part due to the previous Ukrainian strikes against Mariupol and the road to Berdyansk. The commander stated that the previous strikes forced Russian forces to supply the Hulyaipole direction using GLOCs from Crimea instead of GLOCs stemming from occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated and satellite imagery published on June 10 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on two bridges south of Henichesk and near Armyansk.[6] A Russian monitoring Telegram channel commented on Saldo’s report, claiming that Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 10 to 11; on the night of June 7 to 8; and on June 9 temporarily disabled all land routes to occupied Crimea from occupied Kherson Oblast and that Ukrainian forces seriously damaged Chonhar Bridge.[7] Ukrainian forces are increasing their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across occupied southern Ukraine, disrupting Russia’s ability to safely use supply routes from southwestern Russia to occupied Crimea. Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs will likely have cascading battlefield effects and may complicate Russian preparations for offensive operations.
Russian occupation authorities are struggling to address worsening gasoline shortages in occupied Sevastopol, likely due to Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range strikes against Russian logistics and energy infrastructure. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated on June 10 that the Sevastopol occupation administration was unable to issue a new batch of QR codes for fuel purchases, as fuel trucks were unable to reach Sevastopol on June 9 due to unspecified reasons.[8] Razvozhaev introduced a policy on June 6, requiring customers to use a pre-purchased QR code, which citizens can only access via the Russian state-controlled Max messenger app, to purchase gasoline in occupied Sevastopol.[9] Crimean occupation authorities have been increasingly tightening restrictions on gasoline purchase in recent weeks as Ukraine‘s successful strike campaign against Russian transport arteries has caused shortages of gasoline and basic goods in occupied Crimea.[10] Occupation authorities have also tightened restrictions to 20 liters (5.283 gallons) per week from the previous restriction of 20 liters per day as shortages continue to worsen.[11]
Ukrainian forces appear to have achieved a tactical drone overmatch on the battlefield and are intensifying middle-range strike campaign, reportedly driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield amidst declining recruitment rates. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 11 that the Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones outnumber Russian FPV drones on the battlefield by a ratio of 1.5 to one and that this advantage is growing.[12] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces struck almost 180,000 verified targets in May 2026 alone — up 27 percent from April 2026. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces conducted approximately 2,000 mid-range strikes, including against 414 Russian headquarters, control points, and personnel concentrations in May 2026 alone. Syrskyi added that Ukrainian forces completed 12,500 frontline tasks using the unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on June 7 that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded about 35,000 Russian soldiers per month, while Russian forces recruited about 27,000 soldiers per month in the past six months.[13] Stubb noted that the ratio of killed Russian soldiers to Ukrainian soldiers is eight to one, up from the previous three to one. Stubb added that Ukrainian forces fired more missiles and drones at Russia than the Russian defense could repel for the first time in March 2026. Syrskyi similarly reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces killed 12,500 more Russian soldiers than Russian forces managed to recruit since the beginning of 2026 — a figure consistent with Stubb’s statement. Syrskyi noted, citing information from military intelligence, that Russian forces are facing personnel shortages in the unmanned systems units, noting that only 14,500 people signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) — 21 percent of the annual recruitment plan for drone and unmanned systems specialists.
Ukraine has been increasing its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early Spring 2026, which has impeded Russian advances across the theater and is disrupting Russian logistic routes across occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine and into occupied Crimea.[14] Russian forces are simultaneously struggling with an increasing casualty rate that has recently exceeded Russia’s recruitment rate in late 2025 and throughout 2026.[15]
Russia is establishing new and expanding existing military bases along its northern border with NATO, likely in order to support future Russian force projection capabilities against NATO. ISW assesses that Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct ground operations in the near-term, however. Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish broadcasters and a Baltic news portal reported on June 10 that satellite imagery shows that Russian forces are building and expanding their military bases along the border with Nordic and Baltic countries.[16] Danish intelligence officers and senior military officials told Danish broadcasting company DR that Russian forces are engaging in preparation for conflict rather than showing signs that the Kremlin has made a confirmed decision to go to war, especially as the majority of Russian forces are still fighting in Ukraine.[17] Former Finnish intelligence officer Marko Eklund told DR that the Russian command plans to have about 115,000 troops stationed at the northern border with NATO after the end of the war in Ukraine and that Russian forces began the construction of a new base in Novaya Vilza near Petrozavodsk (approximately 190 kilometers from the Finnish border), Republic of Karelia, which will accommodate between 4,000 and 6,000 personnel.[18] Finnish Army Chief Pasi Valimaki told Swedish broadcaster SVT that Finland expects Russia to station 80,000 soldiers at the Russia-Finland border.[19] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian command is relocating unspecified elements of the 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), except for the command post, to the Republic of Karelia. The source claimed that the elements of the command post are currently stationed in Luga, Leningrad Oblast, and have been waiting to move to Petrozavodsk when Russia finishes constructing the bases.[20] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 11 that Russian forces are modernizing at least 19 barracks, infrastructure, and storage facilities in Pechenga (approximately 11 kilometers from the Finnish border) on the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast and expanding a naval infantry base and armored vehicle and landing-craft fleet near Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast.[21] Russia is establishing these bases to support potential future military actions against NATO, though such ground operations remain unlikely, as most of Russia’s combat power is participating in operations in Ukraine. The establishment of these bases will support Russian efforts to more rapidly project forces against NATO following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, however, and NATO must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Russian threat against its borders relatively quickly following the end of combat in Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to fabricate evidence as part of its cognitive warfare effort to support false claims of advance. The Russian MoD posted footage on June 11, which it claimed showed elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seizing Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[22] A local Kharkiv Oblast Telegram channel pointed out on June 11 that the official Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) Telegram channel had posted the same footage on June 10, claiming that it showed Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Ruska Lozova (just north of Kharkiv City and roughly 66 kilometers from Okhrimivka).[23] Russia has increased the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort over the last several months, producing more complex montages with high-production editing and using artificial intelligence (AI) footage to make claims of advance in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions.[24] These videos are part of the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[25]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces continue to interdict several bridges that support ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea.
- Russian occupation authorities are struggling to address worsening gasoline shortages in occupied Sevastopol, likely due to Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range strikes against Russian logistics and energy infrastructure.
- Ukrainian forces appear to have achieved a tactical drone overmatch on the battlefield and are intensifying middle-range strike campaign, reportedly driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield amidst declining recruitment rates.
- Russia is establishing new and expanding existing military bases along its northern border with NATO likely in order to support future Russian force projection capabilities against NATO. ISW assesses that Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct ground operations in the near-term, however.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to fabricate evidence as part of its cognitive warfare effort to support false claims of advance.
- Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- to long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on June 10 and 11. Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 221 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- to long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on June 10 and 11. Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a likely Ukrainian drone striking the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai followed by a secondary explosion.[26] Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 11, citing local reports, that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the oil refinery and damaged an apartment building that is less than two kilometers from the Krasnodar Instrument-Making Plant Kaskad (JSC Kaskad) and three kilometers from the Krasnodar-Tsentralny military airfield.[27] Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows a Ukrainian battalion striking a Russian Tor surface-to-air missile (SAM) west of Levshinka, Kursk Oblast (approximately 40 kilometers from the frontline).[28]
Satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) about recent Ukrainian strikes in the Russian rear. OSINT analyst MT Andreson published satellite imagery on June 10 showing that Ukraine’s June 3 strike against the Russian Steregushchiy-class corvette Boykiy compromised the core of the ship and caused the mainmast and primary radar deck to collapse inward and downward.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that the extent of damage will likely lead the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to decommission the corvette.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations north to southeast of Sumy City in northern Sumy Oblast on June 10 and 11 but did not advance.[31]
Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian air defenses in Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian 8th Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system in the North Slobozhansk direction, likely referring to Sumy or Kursk directions.[32]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 11 that elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced east of Okhrimivka.[35]
See topline text for the Russian cognitive warfare effort involving the claimed seizure of Okhrimivka.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and east of Velykyi Burluk on June 11 but did not advance.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows Russian servicemembers operating in northeastern Kupyansk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[37]
Russian forces are reportedly struggling to advance in the Kupyansk direction. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on June 10 that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone operators are striking Russian boats near Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk) as Russian forces are attempting to advance across the Oskil River.[38] The 16th Army Corps noted that Russian forces continue attempts to cross the Oskil River despite Ukrainian drone strikes.[39]
A Russian milbloger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued ground operations in the Borova direction on June 10 and 11.[40]
Russian forces are reportedly reinforcing their troops southwest of Borova. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 11 that the Russian command is starting to redeploy the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) from Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) to the Rubtsi (southwest of Borova) direction to reinforce the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment after the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion experienced heavy losses.[41]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on June 11 that Ukrainian drone operators struck Russian logistical hubs, trucks with personnel, and fuel and ammunition near occupied Starobilsk (approximately 71 kilometers from the frontline), Aydar (approximately 90 kilometers from the frontline), Novoaydar (approximately 77 kilometers from the frontline), Shchastya (approximately 91 kilometers from the frontline), and Rubizhne (approximately 32 kilometers from the frontline).[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[43] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest and northeast of Lyman.[44]
Ukrainian forces struck a vehicle carrying a Russian battalion commander east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a vehicle that was carrying the Commander and Chief of Staff of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion (6th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Naran Ochir-Goryaev, near Siversk (east of Slovyansk).[45] Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian vehicle east of Siversk, reportedly carrying Goryaev.[46]
Ukrainian forces continue frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BM-21 Grad Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) near Terny (northeast of Lyman and roughly six kilometers from the frontline).[47]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission near Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[48] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in northeastern Rozkishne during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently claimed that elements of the Russian 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) seized Rozkishne.[50] ISW continues to assess that these flag raisings are part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the Ukrainian line as collapsing across the theater.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in northern Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Stepanivka, north of Illinivka (both south of Kostyantynivka), and southwest of Rozkishne.[52]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 11 but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces attempted a motorized assault in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Pokrovsk.[54] A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault in the Pokrovsk direction that included at least three motorcycles.[55] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces reported on June 10 that Russian forces continue to reinforce its troops in the Pokrovsk direction for future assaults, deploying equipment and artillery to the area.[56]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 11 but did not advance.[57]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka).[58]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian transport logistics, including vehicles with infantry, camouflaged vehicles, and a tiger armored vehicle with ammunition, along the M-30 Horlivka-Yenakyieve highway.[59] Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a gas station in Yenakyieve (roughly 41 kilometers from the frontline).[60]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 11 but did not advance.[61]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations west to southeast of Orikhiv on June 11 but did not advance.[62]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian fuel tanker trucks along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in occupied Prymorsk (about 90 kilometers from the frontline).[63] Geolocated images published on June 11 show Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tanker truck along the M-14 highway in occupied Pryazovske (west of Prymorsk and about 86 kilometers from the frontline).[64]
Russian forces continued limited ground activity east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on June 10 and 11 but did not advance.[65]
Ukrainian forces continue striking Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Navy reported on June 11 that Ukrainian Neptune missiles struck a Russian weapons and equipment storage site near Strilestka Bay in occupied Sevastopol (about 238 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on June 10 to 11.[66] A Crimea-based Telegram source published footage of a missile striking the bay and the resulting fire on June 11.[67]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast and 221 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 195 drones, that the two ballistic missiles and 21 drones struck nine locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, administrative, industrial, and railway infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts.[69] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts.[70]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/15878
[2] https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1vN43uwZpDbaqh9XNTk8Fgo6OtzQRlw8&ll=46.2065960657408%2C33.45716695748583&z=16
[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/11/tam-bulo-50-mashyn-zsu-znyshhyly-vorozhi-vantazhivky-z-palyvom-ta-bk-yaki-ruhalysya-cherez-armyansk/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vt2pAFbj4-g
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/
[6] https://x.com/kromark/status/2065017470709117028; https://x.com/HpwWJVafCv83954/status/2064865837828514216;
[7] https://t.me/lpr1_treugolnik/225132
[8] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/11/stoyat-v-ocheredyah-bessmyslenno-glava-anneksirovannogo-sevastopolya-soobschil-chto-v-gorod-ne-prishli-benzovozy-vydannye-zhitelyam-qr-kody-na-toplivo-nedeystvitelny ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/21421
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-4-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[12] https://t.me/osirskiy/1653
[13] https://www.nzz dot ch/international/wir-sollten-mit-putin-reden-sagt-finnlands-praesident-alexander-stubb-er-ist-der-europaeer-der-mit-trump-kann-ld.10009890; https://archive.ph/KdyvH#selection-807.22-807.102;
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/
[16] https://www.dr dot dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/nye-satellitbilleder-afsloerer-russisk-oprustning-langs-graensen-til-norden; https://www.nrk dot no/russland-ruster-opp-langs-grensa-mot-norge_-nato-og-europa_-overrasket-etterretningen-1.17889318; https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/utrikes/avslojar-har-upprustar-ryssland-bara-kilometer-fran-natos-grans
[17] https://www.dr dot dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/nye-satellitbilleder-afsloerer-russisk-oprustning-langs-graensen-til-norden
[18] https://suspilne dot media/1328040-rf-budue-novu-vijskovu-bazu-bila-kordonu-z-finlandieu/; http://yle dot fi/a/74-20230758; https://t.me/astrapress/115354;
[19] https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/utrikes/avslojar-har-upprustar-ryssland-bara-kilometer-fran-natos-grans
[20] https://t.me/severnnyi/8379
[21] https://t.me/rybar/80993
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/64442 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64441; https://t.me/mod_russia/64446
[23] https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/2927 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/19104 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/7470
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[26] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22505 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2064973074190012587; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2064973076446445742
[27] https://t.me/astrapress/115303; https://t.me/astrapress/115317
[28] https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/2064725039233249305; https://t.me/kuaairbome8/895
[29] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2064754954573881531; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/
[30] https://t.me/milinfolive/173999
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788; https://t.me/dva_majors/94383; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745; https://t.me/severnnyi/8375
[32] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1738468513954688 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/11/zasmagaly-bilya-ppo-chornyj-sokil-znyshhyv-rosijskyj-tor-razom-z-ohoronoyu/
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/94383 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8375 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44097 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15629 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44097
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/64442 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64441; https://t.me/mod_russia/64446
[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52600
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/divgen/81441 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745
[37] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2064982985493901692; https://t.me/kcaebirds/3043
[38] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2848; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/10/plyvut-chovnamy-j-goryat-na-berezi-na-harkivshhyni-vzdovzh-beregiv-oskolu-polyuyut-na-okupantiv/
[39] https://t.me/grvZapad/18836
[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52586; https://t.me/grvZapad/18831
[41] https://t.me/grvZapad/18836
[42] https://t.me/ab3army/7175; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/11/vid-starobilska-do-siverskodoneczka-drony-tretogo-korpusu-polyuyut-na-rosijski-kolony-v-tylu/
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745; https://t.me/grvZapad/18831;
[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/18831
[45] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2465
[46] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064736562881925318; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2064736917589999641;
[47] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064775206309171413;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064775888885948464;
https://t.me/fatumgroup/544
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/94383 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12156; https://t.me/mod_russia/64443; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33797; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2065040329485476102
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/64443 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64441
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72826 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52602
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44092
[55] https://armyinform.com dotua/2026/06/11/syly-oborony-zirvaly-vorozhyj-motoshturm-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/ ; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/4173
[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/11/446-okupantiv-za-10-dniv-dronari-7-go-korpusu-dshv-polyuyut-na-shturmovykiv-pid-pokrovskom/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1730674477956354
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745
[58] https://t.me/Soldieroffortune777/74249; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2065068275466174542
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/11/cze-vzagali-krasa-bombanuly-rosiyany-zradily-urazhennyu-uaza-svoyeyi-zh-vijskovoyi-policziyi/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1540059654172724/?rdid=8XxvEd6bG5hCotIl&share_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fshare%2Fv%2F14hhwpZUe4M%2F#
[60] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064800419034149081; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22451; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1957404695867093371
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788; https://t.me/wargonzo/34745
[63] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064786899034579451;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064787816995856473;
https://t.me/luftwaffe422/955
[64] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2065010400601555005; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2064992127306625218; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/959
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39820; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39785
[66] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1050515767645506/?cft[0]=AZZWgwzi2ajYJyumf0DwmV6ic_HqqxstUJseF6HNoVUBvTqizmIg1n_nFb8ZZbxsE2tRCkU9mzR8V-Ju2_dihQx5rZqJYZCySKDXIvNglnZQIt7B9Urr9qA6-pRU1wwvlvQ0ptXd_7IXCWeclOTolsGZLfxZQ_pwwmXZA7DVqoDoXKJnO1DquKMCQtiLRMe2841Ux4QEPJezro8Kz6RsTF14&tn=%2CO%2CP-R
[67] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101586; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101547
[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/64833
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/64833 ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29774 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30072 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/10/vorog-atakuvav-pavlograd-postrazhdaly-5-lyudej/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30069; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30071; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30073; https://t.me/astrapress/115293 ;https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65848; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/11/poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivka-i-pidrozdil-dsns-u-pavlogradi-12-poranenyh-pislya-rosijskoyi-ataky/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30075; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/26958; https://t.me/astrapress/115329; https://t.me/synegubov/22786 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0GnXWV5BuNWUffJNfswzGAwpjSVhA97i3GerQMYeWbLB1Pr3yeKw83BpGTNmiqs8el ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1328108-poskodzeno-sklad-i-avtomobil-naslidki-ataki-na-mikolaivsinu/ ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2528 ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2529 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115333 ; https://t.me/SemenikhinArtem/10099 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1328136-armijci-rf-obstrilali-konotop-misto-bez-elektroenergii-vodu-podaut-za-grafikom/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/114322 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8211; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/11/rosiya-atakuvala-depo-na-sumshhyni-zagynula-zaliznychnyczya-chetvero-praczivnykiv-poraneni/
[70] https://suspilne dot media/1328248-cerez-obstrili-rf-u-sistoh-oblastah-ukraini-e-znestrumlenna-a-zaes-vtratila-zovnisne-zivlenna/; https://t.me/energyofukraine/7195; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5089
